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Abstract
Th   ere is growing clamor in industrial countries for additional border taxes on imports from countries with lower carbon 
prices. We conﬁ  rm the ﬁ  ndings of other research that unilateral emissions cuts by industrial countries will have minimal 
carbon leakage eﬀ  ects. However, output and exports of energy-intensive manufactures are projected to decline, potentially 
creating pressure for trade action. A key factor aﬀ  ecting the impact of any border taxes is whether they are based on the carbon 
content of imports or the carbon content of domestic production. Our quantitative estimates suggest that the former action 
when applied to all merchandise imports would address competitiveness and environmental concerns in high income countries 
but with serious consequences for trading partners. For example, China’s manufacturing exports would decline by one-ﬁ  fth 
and those of all low and middle income countries by 8 percent; the corresponding declines in real income would be 3.7 
percent and 2.4 percent. Border tax adjustment based on the carbon content in domestic production would broadly address 
the competitiveness concerns of producers in high income countries and less seriously damage developing country trade. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
If countries cut emissions by diﬀ  erent amounts, carbon prices are likely to diﬀ  er across countries. 
Countries with higher carbon prices may seek to impose additional border taxes on imports from 
countries with lower carbon prices for two reasons. Th   ey may wish to oﬀ  set the competitiveness 
disadvantage to their ﬁ  rms and the “leakage” of carbon emissions in the form of increased production in 
countries with lower carbon prices. 
A key issue in the run-up to Copenhagen is therefore the scope for trade policy actions in any 
climate change agreement. Th   e internationally minded US Senator John Kerry and the free trade–
oriented Senator Lindsey Graham wrote recently in the New York Times that,
  “... we cannot sacriﬁ  ce another job to competitors overseas. China and India are among the many 
countries investing heavily in clean-energy technologies that will produce millions of jobs. Th   ere is no 
reason we should surrender our marketplace to countries that do not accept environmental standards. 
For this reason, we should consider a border tax on items produced in countries that avoid these 
standards. Th   is is consistent with our obligations under the World Trade Organization and creates 
strong incentives for other countries to adopt tough environmental protections.”
Indeed, the eponymous legislation that these two senators are shepherding through Congress 
provides for such trade actions. President Nicholas Sarkozy of France joined the charge when he said, 
“We need to impose a carbon tax at [Europe’s] borders. I will lead that battle.” Nobel Prize–winning 
trade economist Paul Krugman issued his own endorsement, arguing that carbon taxes at the border are 
“a matter of leveling the playing ﬁ  eld, not protectionism.” And the WTO itself has given a cautious nod: 
“Rules permit, under certain conditions, the use of border tax adjustments on imported and exported 
products,” said an appropriately guarded report jointly issued by the trade body and the United Nations 
Environmental Program.
What is the likely impact of these measures? And how should they be optimally designed? Th  ese  are 
the questions addressed in this paper.
Most of the existing literature focuses on the consequences of unilateral emissions reductions 
and/or oﬀ  setting trade actions for the industrial countries. Th   e studies on the United States (Fischer and 
Fox 2009; Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 2008; and Houser et al. 2008) and the European Union (Aldy 
and Pizer forthcoming; Grubb and Niehoﬀ   2006; Peterson and Schleich 2007; Ponssard and Walker 
2008; Quirion and Demailly 2006; and Reinaud 2005) typically examine two outcomes: (1) the overall 
emissions reductions—the so-called leakage issue; and (2) the impact on producers of energy-intensive 
goods in rich countries—the so-called competitiveness issue. Th   e broad ﬁ  ndings are that unilateral actions 
lead to relatively small leakages in terms of aggregate emissions. However, there can be larger emissions 
and competitiveness eﬀ  ects in some sectors, for example: cement, steel, and aluminum, which can be 3
partially oﬀ  set through trade actions. However, these papers do not quantify the impact of these trade 
actions on developing countries.
In contrast, Atkinson et al. (2009) adopt a more global approach and calculate the eﬀ  ective tariﬀ   
that exporting countries would face on their goods if all importing countries placed a small domestic 
emissions tax. However, even this study does not measure the resulting trade and output consequences. 
In general, few studies have adopted a global approach in trying to quantify simultaneously the eﬀ  ects on 
emissions, as well as sectoral exports and output of all countries—industrial and developing. 
Hence, for many of the vital policy questions that are the subject of this paper, there are currently 
no good answers based on empirical research. An econometric approach seems handicapped by the 
absence of past events and our inability to construct experiments that are comparable with the policy 
changes of greatest interest. We therefore use a multicountry, multisector computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model to derive our quantitative estimates. A CGE approach seems appropriate (Kehoe et al. 
2005) in situations of simultaneous climate and trade policy changes that we consider in this paper, in 
which there could be signiﬁ  cant interaction among the policies of diﬀ  erent countries, and where we 
are interested in quantifying the eﬀ  ects of policy change on output and trade in diﬀ  erent sectors of the 
economy. 
Th   e main empirical ﬁ  ndings are the following. In a diﬀ  erentiated carbon price regime there will 
be strong pressure in the industrial countries to take trade actions against countries that set low carbon 
prices. Environmental concerns cannot be the basis for such actions because “leakage”—emissions 
increases in poor countries as a result of emissions cuts in rich countries—will be low. Given the stated 
level of ambition in the United States and European Union on unilateral emissions reductions—17 
percent cuts by 2020 relative to 2005 levels—the emissions increase in low- and middle-income countries 
will be about 1 percent. Rather, the pressure will emanate from domestic producers of energy-intensive 
manufactures who will witness erosion in their competitiveness, reﬂ  ected in export and output declines, 
which in the United States could amount to 12 and 4 percent, respectively.
A country that has imposed a tax on carbon emissions domestically (or equivalently introduced 
a domestic cap-and-trade scheme) can impose a tax on imports either based on the carbon content of 
domestic production or based on the carbon content embodied in imports.
Our estimates show that imposing tariﬀ  s across the board based on the carbon content of imports 
would address competitiveness concerns of domestic producers and contribute to further emissions 
reductions. But it would be a “nuclear option” in terms of trade consequences. For example, such an 
action by the United States and European Union would be the equivalent of imposing a tariﬀ   of over 20 
percent on China and India—resulting in lost exports of up to 20 percent.
Th   e second option of trade action based on the carbon content in domestic production would allow 4
energy-intensive producers in rich countries to regain most of the competitiveness that they stand to lose 
from emissions reductions action. Th   is option’s trade consequences for developing countries would be less 
serious. From a trade and developing country perspective, the second option would therefore be the least 
harmful of possible border tax adjustments—though still inferior to no border tax adjustment.
Th   is paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe some recent initiatives on trade actions 
in the context of climate change legislation and the WTO status of such actions. In section III we 
spell out the scenarios that underlie our empirical analysis. Section IV describes the simple analytics of 
emissions reductions and international tradability of emissions and transfers. In section V we present the 
results of our quantitative analysis. In Section VI we discuss the implications of our results for the optimal 
design of international rules on trade actions. Section VII provides a concluding assessment.
II. RECENT INITIATIVES ON TRADE ACTIONS AND THEIR WTO STATUS
Th   e US Congress has seen two recent legislative initiatives that create scope for some form of trade 
policy actions. Th   e most recent, which is still being debated in the Senate (Boxer-Kerry), has a general 
provision that calls for border tax adjustments consistent with WTO provisions. Th   is is not precise 
because the interpretation of existing WTO provisions is itself not settled. Greater speciﬁ  city on border 
tax adjustments has been provided in a bill already passed by the House of Representatives (Waxman-
Markey) that contains two kinds of provisions with potential trade impacts. 
First, the bill contemplates the grant of free emissions allowances to certain energy-intensive and/
or trade-intensive industries (which are likely to include iron and steel, paper and paperboard, rubber 
manufacturing, plastics, organic and inorganic chemicals, and petrochemicals). Th   e amount of allowances 
would depend roughly on the sector’s output, its carbon intensity, and the additional “tax” created by 
the emissions cuts. Th   ere are two ways of interpreting these allowances. If the allowances are related to 
historical output (output in the previous two years), then they would amount to a lump sum transfer 
without any marginal impact on production decisions, and hence on trade. Alternatively, producers’ 
knowledge that future allowances are related to current output could have an impact on current decisions 
on output. In this case, allowances would be closer to a production subsidy. It is important to note that in 
either case the magnitude of the allowance would be related to carbon intensity in domestic production.
Second, the bill would require importers in certain sectors (based on the same eligibility criteria as 
for emission allowances) to purchase emission allowances at the going market price. Th   is measure would 
be equivalent to a border tax adjustment because it would serve to raise the price of imports.1 But the 
1. Another form of “border tax adjustment” would be to enact an energy performance or energy intensity standard for certain 
products (say, a ton of steel cannot have a carbon-footprint of more than X tons of CO2) and impose that standard on both 
domestic steel and imported steel (Pauwelyn 2009). 5
magnitude of the border tax would depend on whether the purchase of allowances must cover the actual 
carbon content of imports or the carbon content in comparable domestic output.2 
In the European Union, no clear policy initiatives have so far been taken in relation to border tax 
adjustments. But the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, has recently called for countries in the European 
Union to adopt carbon taxes and to impose adjustments at the border for these taxes. In his view, the idea 
is now “progressing” among EU leaders “because it is more and more understood, not as a protectionist 
measure” but as a way to “rebalance the conditions of free trade and competition.…Otherwise, it is a 
massive aid to relocations. We cannot tax European companies and exempt others.”3 Th   e Chairman of 
the United Kingdom’s Committee on Climate Change Lord Turner noted that the distribution of free 
carbon permits to aﬀ  ected companies had for the time being addressed competitiveness concerns, and has 
stated that border tax adjustment might be a better solution in future. “Looking forward, we should keep 
an open mind about the two approaches.”4
What about the WTO consistency of these possible trade actions? WTO law and jurisprudence 
are evolving and not completely clear on what types of actions would be legitimate. Th   e legality of both 
the free allowances and the border tax adjustments contemplated under the recent US bills is open (see 
Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim 2009; Pauwelyn 2009; Bhagwati and Mavroidis 2007; and WTO 2009, 
among others, for a thoughtful examination of the legal implications of possible trade actions). 
If free emissions allowances are designed to simulate a pure transfer without any eﬀ  ect on marginal 
production decisions, they would probably not be inconsistent with the WTO. On the other hand, if 
they are designed to aﬀ  ect such marginal decisions, they could constitute a trade-distorting production 
subsidy. Unlike export subsidies, production subsidies are not prohibited by WTO rules per se (see Part 
II of the WTO Agreement on Subsides and Countervailing Measures [SCM] and Pauwelyn 2009). 
However, production subsidies are actionable, including in the form of countervailing import duties by 
partner countries (see Part III of the WTO’s SCM agreement). Legitimate action requires the fulﬁ  llment 
of a number of conditions, including demonstration of injury to a domestic industry (see Part V of the 
WTO’s SCM agreement). 
Th   e WTO issue on border tax adjustments relates to the basic national treatment principle in 
Article III of the General Agreement on Tariﬀ  s and Trade (GATT 1994). Th   is article clearly permits the 
2. Th   is requirement on importers would kick in for imports originating in countries that are not part of a future climate change 
agreement or that have not signed sector-speciﬁ  c agreements with the United States. Th   e requirement would become eﬀ  ective 
in 2017 and seems to be the default option unless the president intervenes to waive it. Th   e Waxman-Markey and Boxer-Kerry 
bills both call for this de facto border tax provision to take into account the free emission allowances that are granted under the 
provision described above. Presumably, this is to avoid producers in selected sectors double dipping—beneﬁ  ting from the de facto 
subsidies under the free allowance provision and from the border tax adjustment on imports. 
3. See www.euractiv.com/en/climate-change/france-germany-call-eu-border-tax-co2/article-185580?Ref=RSS.
4. See “EU attacks carbon border tax initiative,”Financial Times October 15, 2009.6
imposition on imports of domestic indirect taxes provided the taxes on imports are no higher than the 
taxes levied on comparable domestic products. Under the GATT panel ruling in the Superfund case, 
indirect taxes levied on domestic inputs could also be imposed on imports provided these inputs were 
embodied in the ﬁ  nal product (see WTO 2009). However, there is no WTO jurisprudence on whether 
such adjustments are permissible for inputs (such as energy) that are used in production but are not 
themselves incorporated in the ﬁ  nal product.5 
Even if border tax adjustment is permitted on inputs that are consumed but not incorporated in the 
ﬁ  nal product, it is not clear whether it should be based on the carbon content of domestic production or 
foreign production. Th   e ruling in the Superfund case suggested that the border tax adjustment could be 
based on the amount of input embedded in the import, so there is a presumption in favor of the latter 
interpretation.6 But there are important practical considerations that favor the former interpretation. For 
example, to implement carbon taxes based on the direct and indirect carbon content in imports would 
require data on inputs used in their production coeﬃ   cients across all sources of imports. Moreover, if 
border tax adjustments are permitted at all, they could be applied to some or all products. 
Th   erefore in our empirical analysis below, we consider the eﬀ  ect of taxes that diﬀ  er both in their 
basis (i.e., domestic or foreign carbon content) and in their scope (on imports of all products or on 
imports of only energy-intensive products).7
III. SCENARIOS 
We constructed a set of scenarios to compare the quantitative implications of recent initiatives (see table 
1). Th   e benchmark scenario involves unilateral emissions reductions by high-income countries, amounting 
to a 17-percent cut by 2020 relative to emissions levels in 2005. Th   is scenario—NBTA17—is close to the 
5. Rules on export subsidies do, however, state that rebates based on energy “consumed” in the process of producing goods for 
exports will not be deemed to be export subsidies (see Annex I of the WTO’s SCM agreement). One argument could be that by 
symmetry, comparable border tax adjustments should be permitted on the import side. 
6. Th   e following discussion of the Superfund case in the WTO’s Analytical Index points in favor of such an interpretation: 
“Th   e tax on certain imported substances equals in principle the amount of the tax which would have been imposed under the 
Superfund Act on the chemicals used as materials in the manufacture or production of the imported substance if these chemicals 
had been sold in the United States for use in the manufacture or production of the imported substance.”
7. Th   ere is a another option, which would be qualitatively diﬀ  erent from those described above in that it would punitively target 
all imports from countries with lower carbon prices and not necessarily be based on carbon content. Th   e aim of such actions 
would be to attempt to change policies relating to carbon abatement across the board. Th   ese actions would be responding less to 
domestic trade concerns than to global environmental concerns. But this option would only be legitimate if it could be justiﬁ  ed 
under the WTO’s exceptions provisions in XX (b) or XX (g) relating respectively to measures necessary to protect human, 
animal, or plant life or health and measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Here we are very much 
in the murky waters of the WTO shrimp turtle case (see Pauwelyn 2009). What WTO jurisprudence, notably in this case, has 
established is the permissibility of national trade policy action to protect the global environment (i.e., to address cross-border 
externalities). However, this right comes attached with a number of conditions that must be met, including the requirement that 
such action be “necessary” to achieve the objective. Recent interpretations of the necessity test have required the exhaustion of 
other reasonable means—notably international cooperation—of attaining the environmental objective.7
unilateral cuts announced by the European Union and the United States (for example, the Boxer-Kerry bill 
calls for a 20-percent cut by 2020). We assume that low- and middle-income countries do not undertake 
any emissions reductions. Modeling cuts by these countries is feasible but adds little to the analysis. While 
this 17-percent cut is the base case scenario, we examine the robustness of our results to a wide range of 
emissions cuts by the United States and European Union ranging from 5 percent to 40 percent.
To depict the alternatives being considered in EU and US legislation, we model three broad 
policy options. Th  e  ﬁ  rst option is a border tax adjustment based on the carbon content embodied in the 
domestically produced good in the importing country; we call this Border Tax Adjustment based on 
Domestic Unrestricted carbon content (BTADU).8 Th   us, if the United States has a CO2 tax of, say, $60 
per ton and the direct and indirect CO2 content in car production in the United States is 10 tons, the 
United States could apply a CO2 tax of $600 on the imports of cars. 
Th   e second option is a similar tax adjustment except that it is based on the carbon content 
embodied in imports, Border Tax Adjustment based on Foreign Unrestricted carbon content (BTAFU). 
In the same example, if the direct and indirect CO2 content in Indian car production is 20 tons, the 
United States could apply a CO2 tax of $1200 on the imports of cars from India.9 
A third option would be to combine a border tax adjustment on imports with a similar border 
tax adjustment on exports thus relieving exporters also of the burden of taxes on carbon, which we call 
scenario Eﬃ   cient Border Tax Adjustment (BTADE). Since export rebates would have to be based on 
the carbon content in domestic production, consistency would require that in this scenario, the tax 
adjustment on imports would also be based on the carbon content in domestic production.
Th   e BTADU scenario can be seen as representing an upper bound on the trade impacts of the US 
(and EU) free emission allowances program. As discussed earlier, this program could either have no eﬀ  ects 
on output and trade or act like a production subsidy. Th   e BTADU scenario involves a tax on imports, 
which is the sum of a production subsidy and consumption tax, and would overstate the eﬀ  ect of the 
allowance program. What makes BTADU comparable with the production subsidy variant of the free 
allowance program is that the basis for the assistance is the carbon intensity in domestic production.
Th   e BTAFU scenario can be seen as reﬂ  ecting border tax adjustment under the provision in draft 
US legislation requiring importers to buy emission allowances equal to the carbon content of imports, as 
well as under the proposals of the French president. Analytically, this is a border tax based on how much 
production costs in the source (developing) country would have increased if it had imposed an identical 
carbon tax. 
8. Note that in all the border tax scenarios, we assume that the adjustment is based on the total carbon content (i.e., direct and 
indirect), data on which are shown in table 4.
9. As is evident from this example, border tax adjustments based on carbon content in imports could vary based on the source of 
imports. 8
Th   e US and EU legislative initiatives do not explicitly provide for the BTADE option, involving 
export rebates of carbon taxes. Th   is probably reﬂ  ects the concerns of environmentalists: it would be odd 
to be taking action on environmental grounds and yet exempt some part of domestic production (namely, 
exports) from carbon taxes. But it is important to consider this policy option. Th   e options in BTADU 
and BTAFU are theoretically problematic because they involve a tax on trade and do not create neutral 
incentives between imports and exports. As Grossman (1982) argued, neutrality in indirect taxes such 
as the value-added tax (VAT) could be achieved only if border tax adjustments are symmetric between 
imports and exports. 
While these are the four main scenarios we will examine in detail, we need to deal with another 
set of possibilities. As currently drafted, US legislation envisages relief mainly for producers in energy-
intensive sectors, which include chemicals, paper, ferrous metals, nonferrous metals, and mineral 
products. But in the four main scenarios, we assume that border tax adjustments are applied on all 
merchandise imports. We do so to highlight the analytics of the various policy options and also because 
the application of border taxes across the board cannot be ruled out either in the United States or 
European Union. However, we will also discuss brieﬂ  y the consequences of restricting these adjustments 
only to imports of energy-intensive goods (scenarios Border Tax Adjustment based on Domestic 
Restricted carbon content [BTADR] and Border Tax Adjustment based on Foreign Restricted carbon 
content [BTAFR]). 
IV. THE SIMPLE ANALYTICS OF UNILATERAL EMISSIONS REDUCTION AND TRADE POLICY 
ACTIONS
We can think of emissions E as an input to the production of a single composite commodity with a 
simple production function that is assumed to be given over the relatively short horizon that we consider 
in this paper (see Panagariya 2009). 
We depict the equilibrium for the world in ﬁ  gure 1. V and V* represent the value of marginal 
products of emissions (i.e., the price of the output times the marginal physical product of emissions) for 
the two groups of countries, say, the poor and rich, respectively. Emissions are measured from the origin 
O for the poor country and O* for the rich countries. In the pre-emissions situation, we assume that the 
price of emissions is zero in both groups of countries. In each group the equilibrium is where the marginal 
beneﬁ  t of emissions equals the zero price of emissions. Th   is occurs at E, resulting in an initial level of 
world emissions of OO*, with OE as the emissions level of the poor and O*E as the emissions level of the 
rich. 
We assume that only rich countries take actions to reduce emissions. Th   us, the origin for measuring 
their emissions shifts inward from O* to O1* and the value of marginal product to V1*. Th   e price of 9
emissions rises to P1* in the rich countries and remains at zero in the poor countries. In this case, rich 
country output declines and rich country ﬁ  rms become less competitive because of their increased costs. 
Th   is can be depicted as a rightward shift in the value of marginal product curve for poor countries to V1 
because they would now receive a higher price for their output. We can therefore think of the output 
declines of the rich countries and the expansion of output in the poor countries as together constituting 
the competitiveness consequences of unilateral emissions reductions action by rich countries. 
In order to illustrate the impact on global emissions, we depict this rightward shift of the V curve 
and the corresponding increase in poor country emissions by moving the origin for the rich countries 
to O2*. Note that this shift represents the leakage eﬀ  ect: while rich countries reduce their emissions by 
O*O1*, some of it is oﬀ  set as poor countries increase their emissions by EE1 (=O1*O2*), and so the global 
reduction in emissions is only O*O2*.
What about the impact of rich countries’ trade action on emissions and output in poor countries? 
Essentially, if rich countries impose a tariﬀ   on exports from poor countries, the eﬀ  ect is akin to depressing 
the price they receive for their output. In ﬁ  gure 1 this can be shown as a leftward shift from V1 to V2 
of the value of marginal product curve for poor countries. However, in order to capture the emissions 
impact of this, we show this as a leftward shift of the origin for rich countries from O2* to O3*. So with 
trade action, as rich countries reduce their emissions by O*O1*, poor countries also reduce their emissions 
by EE2 (=O1*O3*), so the global reduction in emissions is greater at O*O3*. Clearly, the magnitude of 
these shifts will depend on the severity of trade restrictions to which we turn next. 
V. QUANTIFICATION OF THE IMPACT OF UNILATERAL EMISSIONS REDUCTION AND TRADE 
POLICY ACTIONS
For many of the vital policy questions that are the subject of this paper, there are today no good answers 
based on empirical research. An econometric approach seems handicapped by the absence of past events 
and our inability to construct experiments that are comparable with the policy changes of greatest 
interest. In this paper a computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach seems appropriate (Kehoe, 
Srinivasan, and Whalley 2005) because we consider situations of simultaneous policy changes in which 
there could be signiﬁ  cant interaction eﬀ  ects among diﬀ  erent countries. We are interested in quantifying 
the eﬀ  ects of these changes on output and trade in diﬀ  erent sectors of the economy.
Th   e quantitative results presented in this paper rely on a speciﬁ  c CGE model that has been 
developed at the World Bank, known as the Environmental Impact and Sustainability Applied General 
Equilibrium model, or the Envisage model.10 Th   e primary purpose of the Envisage model is to assess the 
10. Th   e model has several distinguishing features: a focus on developing countries and signiﬁ  cant sectoral disaggregation; an 
integrated climate module that generates changes in global mean temperature based on emissions of four greenhouse gases; and 
economic damage functions linked to changes in temperature. A summary description of the model and the key assumptions are 
provided in the technical appendix and van der Mensbrugghe (2008) provides a full description of the model.10
growth and structural impacts for developing countries from climate change itself and policies to address 
climate change—either unilaterally or in an international agreement. 
Any quantitative analysis in this ﬁ  eld are conditional on assumptions regarding exogenous 
developments (for example the future cost of alternative technologies), key parameter values (for example 
intrafuel substitution elasticities), and model speciﬁ  cation (for example carbon tax revenue recycling). 
Our quantitative exercise is meant to be illustrative of the signs and broad magnitudes of eﬀ  ects, rather 
than be taken as deﬁ  nitive in any way. Th   e reader should nonetheless keep in mind certain caveats 
regarding the model and its results. 
First and foremost, the model is not equipped to quantify any of the welfare beneﬁ  ts from emissions 
reductions per se and does not take account of emissions related to forestry.
Second, the model does not take into account any preexisting subsidies or other distortions 
in developing-country energy markets whose elimination could provide opportunities for emission 
abatement. Th   e OECD (2009) has calculated the fuel subsidies in a number of developing economies. 
Most of these are consumption rather than production subsidies and, although they vary across fuel types 
and income groups, their average value is relatively low (for example, less than 3 percent for China). Th  is 
suggests that eliminating these subsidies will have positive welfare consequences that our results do not 
incorporate. However, the fact that the magnitudes are low would suggest that our results relating to 
compositional changes may not be signiﬁ  cantly aﬀ  ected.
Th   ird, the model is not able to represent the full range of available alternative technologies, and 
so may tend to exaggerate the output and trade responses as energy prices rise with emission limits. But 
some features of the model may limit the biases on this score. We allow for exogenous improvements 
in manufacturing energy eﬃ   ciency through the accumulation of more advanced capital stock. Also, the 
current version of the Envisage model does allow for limited substitution between technologies. For 
example, it allows for switching to alternative (and cleaner) technologies in the power sector, albeit in 
limited fashion.11 Th   e model also allows for some substitution to natural gas in the transportation sector 
but not to biofuels and to electricity (only to the extent that some modes of public transportation already 
rely on electricity). 
11. Th   e current electricity technologies include ﬁ  ve activities—coal, oil and gas, hydro, nuclear, and other (essentially renewable). 
Th  e  ﬁ  ve activities are aggregated together to “generate” a single electricity commodity distributed to households and producers. 
Th   e “aggregator” (for example the electricity distribution sector) chooses the least-cost supplier subject to a constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) aggregation function (that is calibrated to base year shares). Th   us the coal producer will see a decline in 
demand relative to other producers—particularly hydro, nuclear, and other—when subject to the carbon tax. Th  e  amount  of 
the shift will depend on both the overall demand elasticity as well as the base year share. In the current baseline, these shares are 
ﬁ  xed at base year levels. It is clear that there are non-price factors that are pushing these shares in one direction or another and 
we are witnessing rapid rises (from a very low base) in renewable technologies (notably wind and solar). In the model, and in 
reality, expansion of hydro is limited to physical potential. We make no eﬀ  ort to model changes in the share of nuclear power. In 
addition, the model ignores one potentially signiﬁ  cant change in power generation and that is the introduction of carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) for coal and gas powered thermal plants. However, CCS is unlikely to become a major technology before 2020 
(though its anticipation could aﬀ  ect investment decisions in the near term). CCS may also be a feasible technology in some other 
fossil fuel–dependent sectors such as cement and iron and steel production.11
Th   e limited possibilities for technological substitution may not be unrealistic given that our horizon 
is relatively short term: we are projecting economic magnitudes for 2020, about 10 years from today. Also, 
the emission taxes and the consequential price changes in our model are relatively small. For example, 
in the most extreme scenario, when both high and low income countries reduce emissions, the overall 
price of energy rises by 41 percent in China and 26 percent in India. Th   ese prices are not large enough to 
induce large technology-switching responses. For example, Birdsall and Subramanian (2009) ﬁ  nd that it 
took the oil price shock of the 1970s—which involved a quadrupling of energy prices—to induce a small 
response in energy eﬃ   ciency in production and even more modest response on the consumption side. 
We describe ﬁ  rst the benchmark scenario where high income countries make unilateral emissions 
reductions and then turn to the implications of trade policy action.
No Trade Policy Actions
In the benchmark scenario, which we call the no border tax adjustment (NBTA), we assume that after 
2012, a carbon tax is imposed in OECD countries to achieve a 17-percent cut of total OECD carbon 
emission by 2020 (relative to the 2005 level). 
We ﬁ  rst focus on the competitiveness eﬀ  ects in industrial countries. Th   e quantitative impacts are 
summarized in table 2.12 Th   e imposition of a carbon tax by OECD countries can be expected to curtail 
domestic output of all carbon-intensive goods and services, ranging from coal, oil, and natural gas to 
electricity. But competitiveness eﬀ  ects will be felt most sharply in the case of tradable goods like chemicals 
and plastics, paper products, minerals like cement, ferrous and nonferrous metals. Table 2 conﬁ  rms that 
the impact of unilateral emissions reductions by the rich countries will lead to an increase in imports and 
a decline in the exports and output of the United States and European Union. For example, exports of 
energy-intensive manufacturing goods decline by 12 percent in the United States and 5 percent in the 
European Union, whereas output of these goods declines by 4 percent in the United States and by 2 
percent in the European Union. Th  e  eﬀ  ects are greater in the United States than in the European Union 
because both energy and carbon intensity of these sectors in the United States are nearly double those in 
the European Union (table 4). Th   is also helps us to understand why calls for trade action at the border are 
more insistent in the United States than the European Union.
Because developing countries do not impose comparable taxes, the action by the high income 
countries leads to increased imports of carbon-intensive products from countries like Brazil, China, and 
India, which therefore see an expansion in exports of these products of about 6 to 8 percent. However, 
what matters for emissions is the impact on these countries’ overall output and its composition. Because 
12. In the text, we focus on the impact on selected countries (the United States, the European Union, China, India, and Brazil) 
and selected groups (high income and low and middle income). More disaggregated impacts and other data are presented in 
appendix tables 2–8.12
exports are a small proportion of output, the output increase of carbon-intensive sectors in Brazil, China, 
and India is only about 1 to 2 percent (appendix table 5). Furthermore, this expansion pulls resources 
out of other sectors, which has an oﬀ  setting eﬀ  ect on emissions even though these latter sectors are less 
carbon intensive. As a result, the “leakage” eﬀ  ect is quite small—the emissions in low and middle income 
countries are only 1 percent higher than business-as-usual levels (table 3). For example, China’s emissions 
increase from 3,679 to 3,700 Million metric tons (MtC) and India’s from 805 to 811 MtC. Th  us,  given 
the assumptions of our model, the limited unilateral action envisaged by high-income countries to reduce 
their carbon emissions will not in and of itself lead to a large emissions increase in poor countries.13
Impact of Trade Policy Actions Based on Carbon Content in Domestic Production
Despite the limited leakage eﬀ  ect, there is likely to be pressure on industrial countries—e.g., from their 
own energy-intensive industries, which will face serious competitive pressures as our estimates indicate—
to take trade policy actions, most likely in the form of additional border taxes on imports from countries 
that do not tax emissions at comparable levels. 
BTADU involves a border tax applied on all imported products equivalent to that imposed on 
the carbon content in the like domestic product. Th  e  eﬀ  ects of such a tax on output and exports in the 
industrial countries imposing this tariﬀ   are summarized in table 2. Th   e average tax across all goods is about 
3 to 5 percent, but the level is a little higher on energy-intensive goods at 6 to 8 percent (table 5). Th  is 
import tax dampens the adverse output and trade consequences of the carbon tax increase for industrial 
countries. For example, imports of energy-intensive goods now decline by 4.6 percent (compared to a 
3.5-percent increase without import action) in the United States and output of such goods declines by 3.6 
percent compared with a 4.4-percent decline without oﬀ  setting trade action (table 2). 
Th   e impact on developing countries in the BTADU scenario is summarized in table 6. Changes in 
welfare and output of low- and middle-income countries are less than 1 percent and exports decline by 
around 3 percent. Th   ere is a smaller increase in developing-country emissions as a result of this action (0.3 
percent compared with 1 percent without trade action) so that global emissions also decline a little more 
(9.8 percent versus 9.3 percent without trade action).14 
Impact of Trade Policy Actions Based on Carbon Content in Imports
More disruptive trade action would involve border tax adjustments based on the carbon content in 
imports and applied to all manufacturing sectors (BTAFU). Note ﬁ  rst that such an action would address 
13. Of course this result, like all others, is conditional on the supply/demand elasticities of our general equilibrium (GE) model. 
For a comparison of our results with those of other models, see the section on “Unilateral Action and Leakage” in the technical 
appendix. 
14. Note that if high-income countries allocated free emissions allowances along the lines discussed in section II, the impact on 
emissions reductions would be smaller than if they imposed a tariﬀ  . 13
both competitiveness and environmental concerns in industrial countries. Manufacturing output in 
energy-intensive industries in the United States would now decline only by 2.5 percent and in the 
European Union it would actually increase by 1.8 percent. Th  ese  eﬀ  ects are now concentrated not only 
in energy-intensive manufacturing but spread out over the entire manufacturing sector. As a result, the 
eﬀ  ects on aggregate manufacturing in high-income countries are positive, resulting in an increase in 
output. Under this scenario, low- and middle-income countries’ emissions would also decline by 1.5 
percent as against the zero impact when actions are based on the carbon content of domestic production.
Th   ese outcomes in the high income countries would come at a huge cost for developing country 
trading partners. Since production in countries like China and India is much more carbon intensive than 
in OECD countries, import taxes on all manufactured goods in the BTAFU scenario are much higher 
than in the BTADU scenario—an average tariﬀ   of about 26 percent on manufactured goods imports 
from China and of about 20 percent from India (table 5).15 
As a result, for China, aggregate manufacturing exports decline by about 21 percent, and for India, 
by 16 percent, and manufacturing output by close to 3.5 percent in both countries (table 6). Brazil is 
much less aﬀ  ected because its exports are far less carbon intensive. 
Th   e impact in welfare is also signiﬁ  cant. Whereas the BTADU scenario would have smaller eﬀ  ects 
on welfare in China, India, and all low- and middle-income countries, the BTAFU scenario would reduce 
welfare in these countries by 3.7, 1.4, and 2.4 percent, respectively (table 6).
Th   us, trade policy actions based on the carbon content of imports applied to all imports would have 
substantial eﬀ  ects. 
Impact of Trade Policy Actions Based on Carbon Content in Domestic Production but Applied 
to Imports and Exports
Recall that border tax adjustments in the BTADU scenarios are akin to a tariﬀ   on imports. Trade theory 
suggests that a tax on imports is also a tax on exports and so this type of adjustment taxes trade twice, 
and is likely to be ineﬃ   cient. From Grossman (1982) and Lockwood and Whalley (2008), we know that 
the way to eliminate the distortion would be to have symmetric tax adjustments so that the indirect tax 
burden on exports is also relieved. We call this the eﬃ   cient border tax (BTADE).
Eﬃ   cient border taxes (BTADE) will allay the competitiveness concerns in industrial countries to 
a greater degree than the corresponding tax adjustment applied only to imports (BTADU). Th   is is not 
surprising because in these countries exporters’ competitiveness is also improved. Th  us,  energy-intensive 
manufacturing sectors in the United States witness a decline in output of 0.8 percent under BTADE 
15. Production could be relatively carbon intensive in developing countries for these broad Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
categories both because individual products are produced more carbon-intensively and because the broad product categories 
include more carbon-intensive products.14
compared with 1.2 percent in BTADU. In the European Union, BTADE actually allows a more than full 
clawback of competitiveness losses for energy-intensive producers because output increases by 1 percent 
compared with a 0.2-percent decline in the BTADU scenario.16 
Th   e impact on developing-country trade is also unambiguously smaller under BTADE (and of 
course much smaller than under the BTAFU scenario) than under BTADU. For example, manufacturing 
exports of China and India decline by 1.8 and 2.1 percent, respectively, in the BTADE scenario 
compared with 3.4 and 3.2 percent, respectively, in the BTADU scenario. Th   is seems to be in accordance 
with the Grossman result (1982) that the BTADU border adjustment taxes trade and hence shrinks 
trading opportunities also for partner countries.17 
A symmetric border tax adjustment would also be superior to the alternatives (BTAFU and BTADU) 
from a global eﬃ   ciency perspective. We know that trade actions based on imports’ carbon content imply a 
very high tariﬀ   and hence lead to large global eﬃ   ciency losses of 1 percent. Under BTADE and BTADU, 
welfare declines are nearly halved, with BTADE being superior to BTADU. Global welfare declines by 
0.52 percent in the former and by 0.58 percent in the latter. Global emissions also decline marginally more 
in the BTADE scenario (10 percent) than in the BTADU scenario (9.8 percent).18 
Th   e foregoing discussion suggests that from the perspectives of political economy in industrial 
countries, trade interests of developing countries, and of global eﬃ   ciency, symmetric and eﬃ   cient border 
tax adjustment (BTADE) is the least undesirable alternative. 
Impact of Trade Policy Actions Based on Their Product Coverage
Th   us far, we have examined the impacts of trade actions applied to all merchandise imports. What if they 
are only applied to energy-intensive imports? It turns out that if border taxes were applied only to energy-
intensive imports, they would broadly achieve the goals of minimizing the adverse competitiveness eﬀ  ects 
in industrial countries from unilateral emissions reductions while also moderating the trade impact on 
developing-country partners. For example, the decline in energy-intensive manufacturing output in the 
United States in the BTADR and BTAFR scenarios are respectively 2.6 and 0.5 percent. Th   e decline in 
China’s and India’s manufacturing exports is between 1 to 3 percent in both scenarios.
Despite these results, limiting the scope of trade actions to energy-intensive products would have 
problems that we discuss below. 
16. In fact, eﬃ   cient border tax adjustment (BTADE) addresses the competitiveness concerns of the energy-intensive sectors in 
some high income countries such as the United States even more eﬀ  ectively than the drastic action in the BTAFU scenario. Th  e 
reason is that the output beneﬁ  ts of export rebates are greater than of further increases in tariﬀ  s. 
17. However, the BTADE scenario is not superior to the BTADU scenario for developing countries’ manufacturing output. 
18. Another way of understanding the BTADE scenario is as a consumption tax on emissions, and the NBTA17 as a pure 
production tax on emissions. Global welfare decline is marginally lower in the NBTA scenario compared with BTADE scenario 
(0.49 percent versus 0.52 percent) but the emissions decline is greater in the BTADE scenario than in the BTADU scenario (10 
percent versus 9.3 percent). Th   us a pure consumption-based tax is overwhelmingly superior to a tax that distorts trade (BTADU) 
but is not unambiguously superior to a pure production tax. 15
Robustness to Diff  erent Emissions Reductions by High Income Countries
Are our results contingent on the speciﬁ  c assumption we have made about emissions reductions by 
industrial countries? We replicate the analysis above for a range of assumptions about unilateral emissions 
reductions by high-income countries, ranging from 5 to 40 percent, complemented with oﬀ  setting trade 
actions. Th   e results are depicted in ﬁ  gures 2 and 3.19 Figure 2a captures the eﬀ  ects on global emissions. 
It shows that the magnitude of global emissions decline is related to the size of the cuts by industrial 
countries. Also, the largest emissions declines occur when border tax adjustments are taken on all 
products based on the carbon content in imports (BTAFU). But the diﬀ  erence in emissions reductions 
is not signiﬁ  cant across scenarios. Th   e reasons are suggested in ﬁ  gure 2b, which depicts the possible 
leakage of emissions to developing countries. Th   e greatest leakage occurs, unsurprisingly, in the case 
of unilateral emissions reductions without oﬀ  setting trade action. But even in this case, the leakage is 
small—a maximum of a 2.5-percent increase in emissions when industrial countries reduce emissions by 
40 percent. Th   e reasons for this, as explained above are twofold: emissions reductions by high-income 
countries increase developing countries’ exports of energy-intensive goods, but exports are a small fraction 
of output—moderating the emissions impact. Moreover, in the long run and under full employment, any 
expansion of energy-intensive sectors will lead to a contraction of other sectors, further moderating the 
emissions impact.
Figure 3a illustrates the competitiveness impact in industrial countries. Th   e larger the emissions 
reductions, the greater the negative impact on competitiveness (all the curves—except in the scenario 
BTADE—are downward sloping and the scenario with no oﬀ  setting trade action is the most steep). 
Th   e milder form of trade action (BTADU) can claw back most of the competitiveness eﬀ  ects (the curve 
associated with this scenario is closer to the x-axis). Th   e extreme form of trade action (BTAFU) is even 
more successful in clawing back the competitiveness loss from unilateral emissions reduction. But it is 
the eﬃ   cient border tax adjustment (BTADE) that is successful in more than oﬀ  setting the impact of 
unilateral emissions reductions. Th   e main reason is that the BTADE regime addresses the competitiveness 
loss not just in the domestic market but also in foreign markets.20 
Th   e impact on China and India is shown in ﬁ  gures 3b and 3c. Th   e impact on manufacturing output 
remains relatively muted when no trade policy actions are taken (NBTA17) or when the trade policy 
action is based on domestic carbon content (BTADU and BTADE). But actions based on the carbon 
19. For presentational clarity, we focus on the four main scenarios: NBTA17, BTADU, BTAFU, and BTADE. 
20. Th   e BTADE results are sensitive to the manner in which subsidies are calculated. In the analysis presented in the text, 
subsides are linked to ex ante (base-year) levels of carbon content as is likely to be done in practice. But insofar as exporters 
reduce the carbon content of their production in response to higher energy prices, they are in eﬀ  ect overcompensated and the 
higher output is the consequence. We also redid the scenarios with border taxes based on the ex post carbon content (results are 
available from the authors upon request).16
content of imports and applied to all merchandise imports lead to a dramatic decline in exports with the 
magnitude depending on the extent of unilateral emissions reduction by industrial countries (BTAFU). 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE RULES
From a pure trade perspective, the best outcome would be to have no scope for carbon-based border 
tax adjustment. Clearly, this would not be true from an environmental perspective. Th   at is why, as we 
have noted in the introduction, unconstrained border tax adjustments are already under consideration 
and enjoy a certain measure of support, including from the WTO. It may, therefore, be useful to assess 
alternatives from both trade and environmental perspectives. 
It is worth recalling the alternative rationales for border tax adjustments. From a trade perspective, 
border tax adjustments (BTAs) applied symmetrically to imports and exports essentially transform 
production-based taxes into consumption-based taxes (Grossman 1982). Such adjustments do not alter 
the incentives within a country to produce exports or receive imports. From an environmental perspective, 
border tax adjustments are aimed at ensuring that the emissions reductions achieved within a country 
through a tax (production tax) are not totally oﬀ  set by the increase in emissions that occurs in partner 
countries by virtue of expanded trade. Th   at is, border tax adjustments attempt to tax the emissions in 
trade. One diﬀ  erence between the eﬃ   ciency and environmental motivations for BTAs is that with the 
former, a country would apply BTAs regardless of what partner countries do. In contrast, with the latter, 
BTAs are typically aimed only at countries that do not take some or comparable action on emissions 
reductions. 
What would be the status of diﬀ  erent forms of BTAs under existing trade rules? Recall that current 
WTO rules and jurisprudence are not settled. If taxes on consumed inputs cannot be subject to border tax 
adjustment, then it would seem that neither taxes based on the carbon content of domestic production 
nor those based on the carbon content embodied in imports can be the basis for border adjustments. Of 
course, both bases for applying border taxes could be justiﬁ  ed by the environmental exceptions provisions 
of Article XX (GATT 1994), but that avenue itself is untested and uncertain. If indirect taxes on inputs 
such as carbon/energy that are consumed in production can be subject to border tax adjustment—which 
is far from clear—then it would seem that the presumption would be that these taxes would be based 
on the carbon content embodied in imports. Th   is interpretation is suggested by the GATT dispute 
settlement panel’s ruling in the Superfund case and indeed, it would be consistent with viewing border 
tax adjustments as environmental measures aimed at taxing the consumption of the oﬀ  ending input. 
Our results suggest that BTAs based on carbon content in imports would have drastic trade 
consequences. Th   ere is also a serious practical problem with BTAs based on inputs that are consumed in 
the process of producing the output. Implementing carbon taxes based on the direct and indirect carbon 17
content in imports would require data not only on production methods in all source countries but also 
information on the origin of each input. Diﬀ  erent imports from one country could have diﬀ  erent carbon 
content depending on where the inputs used in production were sourced: US imports of car A from 
Malaysia that used steel from, say, Brazil would face a diﬀ  erent kind of border tax adjustment than car 
B also from Malaysia that used steel from China. In a world of internationally fragmented production, 
establishing the precise carbon content of any particular product would be nearly impossible. Th  ese 
daunting informational requirements could allow considerable scope for rent-seeking behavior as ﬁ  rms try 
to manipulate information to inﬂ  uence the taxes imposed on particular goods from particular countries.
Th   ese considerations suggest that a possible compromise between no border tax adjustments, which 
is best from a trade perspective, and BTAFU (i.e., adjustment based on carbon content of imports), 
which is attractive from an environmental perspective, could be adjustment based on the carbon content 
in domestic production (BTADU or BTADE). Countries could accept this principle as a pragmatic and 
negotiated compromise between not just trade and environmental concerns, but also between the interests 
of diﬀ  erent countries. Th   e case for such adjustment is strengthened by our ﬁ  nding that unilateral emission 
reductions by industrial countries lead primarily to a loss in industrial competitiveness rather than to 
signiﬁ  cant “leakage” of emissions. Adjustment based on carbon content in domestic production addresses 
competitiveness concerns in industrial countries without inﬂ  icting undue pain on developing countries.
Could the suggested application of uniform BTA across countries be seen as discrimination against 
those whose production is relatively less carbon intensive (e.g., Brazil)? While this concern is valid in 
principle, in practice it could be less important. Even developing countries like Brazil have a higher 
carbon intensity of production than the industrial countries, so any uniform BTA would not penalize 
them unduly in absolute terms (even though it would not take into account their low carbon intensity 
relative to countries like China). Furthermore, an importing country (like the United States) could chose 
to exempt those countries that were either very carbon eﬃ   cient or were taking action to reduce emissions 
(e.g., in the European Union) from BTAs. In practice, US legislation is pointing in this direction. 
One other issue relates to the choice between border tax adjustments applied symmetrically to 
imports and exports (BTADE) and those applied only to imports (BTADU). From a trade perspective, 
the former is superior. Our interesting result, of course, is that even from an emissions perspective, the 
symmetric adjustment is superior (see ﬁ  gure 2a). But it is possible that environmentalists will object to 
rebating energy taxes on inputs that go into export production. Whether countries adopt the symmetric 
version (BTADE) or the imports-only variant (BTADU) is something that could best be left to individual 
countries to decide based on their respective weighting of the trade and environmental concerns. 
How would our proposed approach compare with others? Consider ﬁ  rst the arguments made by Paul 
Krugman. In his blog, he wrote: “Th   e WTO has looked at the issue, and suggests that carbon tariﬀ  s may 18
be viewed the same way as border adjustments associated with value-added taxes. It has long been accepted 
that a [value-added tax] VAT is essentially a sales tax—a tax on consumers—which for administrative 
reasons is collected from producers. Because it’s essentially a tax on consumers, it’s legal, and also 
economically eﬃ   cient, to collect it on imported goods as well as domestic production; it’s a matter of leveling 
the playing ﬁ  eld, not protectionism. And the same would be true of carbon tariﬀ  s” (emphasis ours).21 
But it should be emphasized that border tax adjustments applied to imports alone (and not to 
exports) would not be “economically eﬃ   cient” because they would distort trade. As we suggest, there may 
be good environmental reasons to limit trade actions to imports alone but there is then a conﬂ  ict with 
eﬃ   ciency that must be recognized. 
Our proposed approach would be slightly diﬀ  erent from the widely cited proposal made in 
Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim (2009) who suggest a hybrid system for border tax adjustments. In their 
scheme, there would be no border tax adjustments on imports from a country that was taking substantial 
or comparable action on emissions reductions as the importing country. Th   ey would, however, allow 
a country to apply a border tax adjustment on imports if the domestic emissions tax in the importing 
country is greater than in the exporting country, reﬂ  ecting the destination principle. As noted above, this 
amounts to distorting trade. While they do not specify whether the border tax adjustment on imports 
would be based on the carbon content of imports or domestic production, the spirit of their proposal 
seems to strongly favor the former. Th   us, their proposal diﬀ  ers from ours in two ways: they would not 
allow for symmetric border tax adjustment (BTADE); and they would in principle allow for and even 
require border tax adjustments based on the carbon content in imports (BTAFU or BTAFR). We 
have shown that the BTAFU option would have serious trade consequences and even a more restricted 
application of border tax adjustments (BTAFR) is problematic, as we argue below. 
What about the alternative of limiting the scope for trade actions to energy-intensive imports, which 
our results suggest would be close to the symmetric border tax adjustment from a trade perspective? 
Th   ere are a number of problems with this approach. First, it would still leave room for border taxes based 
on the carbon content of imports, which has a number of problems already discussed earlier. Second, 
even if trade actions were initially restricted to energy-intensive goods, they could provoke demands for 
extension: non-energy-intensive sectors would ask why they were being excluded from import relief, 
especially given, as our data shows, that there are large cross-country diﬀ  erences in total carbon intensity 
even in nonenergy-intensive sectors (see table 4). Th   e risk that rules to restrict trade action to selected 
sectors could be vulnerable in this manner (i.e., open to future extension) is suggested by a recent EU 
Council decision on border tax adjustments.22 
21. Th   ese arguments by Krugman (2009) can be found at: www.krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/29/climate-trade-obama/.         
22. www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/110889.pdf.19
It is important to note that any border tax adjustment option is vulnerable to the slippery slope 
argument. If the principle is accepted that border tax adjustments could be applied to nonembodied 
inputs consumed in the process of production, then this might open the door to similar adjustments for 
taxes on other inputs that are not embodied, and perhaps to other domestic taxes and regulations more 
broadly. Th   is is another argument for not allowing the principle of carbon-based border tax adjustment in 
the ﬁ  rst place. 
Finally, one way of ruling out border tax adjustments by industrial countries would be for 
developing countries to impose export taxes on carbon-intensive goods. Th   is would have a number of 
advantages for developing countries. Because such an action would address both the competitiveness 
and environmental concerns in industrial countries, it would head oﬀ   the pressure for BTAs in these 
countries. Developing countries would get to keep the tax revenues for themselves whereas with a BTA 
the importing country would obtain the revenues. Th   e analogy here is with a voluntary export restraint 
(VER) compared to an import restriction. Developing countries could also calibrate the cost shock that 
they would impose on their exporters more appropriately than a BTA imposed by an importing country. 
For example, in the BTAF scenarios, exports from China could face an unfavorable cost shock that is a 
combination of the US emissions tax and Chinese carbon intensity. A Chinese export tax would be based 
on Chinese carbon intensity but China could impose a lower tax than that in the United States. Any such 
export tax option would obviously have to be negotiated between importing and exporting countries, and 
its attractiveness would depend on the likely alternatives. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Under the range of likely emissions reductions being envisaged by the major industrial countries, there 
will be clamor to oﬀ  set the competitiveness pressure of imports from countries that make less ambitious 
reductions. For example, if industrial countries reduce emissions by 17 percent by 2020 relative to 2005 
levels, energy-intensive industries in the United States will face output declines of around 4 percent. 
Th   ere will also be demands from environmentalists for trade action on the grounds of emissions “leakage” 
but our estimates show that these concerns are not warranted. 
Analytically, industrial countries can respond to competitiveness concerns by imposing tariﬀ  s 
or border tax adjustments. Th   e most extreme form of trade action would be one that is based on the 
carbon content of imports and applied to all merchandise imports. Th   is would no doubt address the 
competitiveness and environmental concerns in high income countries but would come at the price of 
seriously damaging the trade prospects of developing-country trading partners. Such an action would 
imply average tariﬀ  s on merchandise imports from India and China of over 20 percent and would depress 
manufacturing exports between 16 and 21 percent. 20
A border tax adjustment based on the carbon content in domestic production would broadly 
address the competitiveness concerns of producers in high-income countries while inﬂ  icting less damage 
on developing country trade. Th   is option is, therefore, the least undesirable from a developing-country 
trade perspective. Th   erefore, as part of any international agreement on climate change, all countries 
could seek to negotiate rules in the WTO that would either prohibit all forms of carbon-based border 
tax adjustment, or at most allow under the strictest conditions the least undesirable option. Whether a 
domestic carbon-based tax should be applied symmetrically to imports and exports or only to imports 
is a choice that could be left to individual countries based on their relative assessment of trade and 
environmental concerns.
We would stress the desirability of international agreement on trade actions being pursued as part of 
climate change rather than leaving it to future negotiations in the WTO. Otherwise developing countries 
will remain vulnerable to trade policy action, especially in its extreme version. Not only would such a 
state of aﬀ  airs render developing countries uncertain of the overall beneﬁ  ts of international cooperation 
on climate change, it might actually vitiate the atmosphere and hence worsen the prospects for achieving 
such cooperation. 
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Figure 1     Unilateral emission reduction and trade policy action
Source:  Arvind Subramanian.
Figure 2a     Impact of unilateral emissions reductions 
  by industrial countries on global emissions
  (percent change:  relative to business as  
















Reduction in emissions (percent)
Change relative tobusiness as usual in2020
Source:  Authors’ calculations.24
Figure 2b     Impact of unilateral emissions reductions 
  by industrial countries on emissions of low- 
  and middle-income countries (percent 















Change relative to business as usual (percent)
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Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Figure 3a     Impact of unilateral emissions reductions by
  industrial countries on their output of
  energy-intensive manufacturing (percent 
  change:  relative to 2005 for emissions
  reductions; and relative to business as usual
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Source:  Authors’ calculations.25
Figure 3b     Impact of unilateral emissions reductions
  by industrial countries on China’s 
  manufacturing output (percent change: 
  relative to 2005 for emissions reductions; 
  and relative to business as ususal in 2020 
 for  output) 












NBTA17 Reduction in emissions (percent)
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Figure 3c     Impact of unilateral emissions reductions
  by industrial countries on India’s 
  manufacturing output (percent change:
  relative to 2005 for emissions reductions;
  and relative to business as usual in 2020 













Change in output for energy-intensive manufacturing (percent)
Reduction in emissions (percent)







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TECHNICAL APPENDIX: THE MODEL AND NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
Th   e results in this paper rely on the World Bank’s Environmental Impact and Sustainability Applied 
General Equilibrium (Envisage) model (see van der Mensbrugghe 2008). Th   e Envisage model’s core is a 
relatively standard recursive dynamic global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Incorporated 
with the core CGE model is a greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions module that is connected to a simple 
climate module that converts emissions into atmospheric concentrations, radiative forcing, and changes 
in mean global temperature. Th   e climate module has feedback on the economic model through so-called 
damage functions—currently limited to productivity shocks in agriculture. Th   e combination of the socio-
economic CGE model with the climate module is commonly referred to an integrated assessment model 
(IAM).
Envisage is calibrated to Release 7 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) dataset with a 
2004 base year (see www.gtap.org). It has been used to simulate dynamic scenarios through 2100. For 
the purposes of this study, 2020 is the terminal year. Th   e 113 countries/regions of GTAP are aggregated 
to 15 countries/regions for this study and the 57 sectors are aggregated to 21 sectors. Full detail on the 
aggregation is provided in appendix table 1. Th   e GTAP data is supplemented with satellite accounts that 
include emissions of the so-called Kyoto gases—carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
(N2O) and hydroﬂ  uorocarbons (F-gases), diﬀ  erent electricity production activities (coal, oil and gas, 
hydro, nuclear, and other), and potential land and hydro supplies.
Within each time period a full equilibrium is achieved given the ﬁ  xed regional endowments, 
technology, and consumer preferences. Production is modeled as a series of nested constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) functions that are designed to reﬂ  ect the substitution and complementarity of inputs. 
Unlike many standard models, energy plays a key role as an input and is modeled as a complement to 
capital in the short run but a substitute to capital in the long run. Th  is  reﬂ  ects the putty/clay speciﬁ  cation 
of production that incorporates vintage capital. Th   e key assumption is that there is greater substitution 
across inputs in the long run (i.e., with new capital) than in the short run (with old or installed capital). 
One consequence of this speciﬁ  cation is that countries that have higher growth and higher rates of 
investment typically have a more ﬂ  exible economy in the aggregate. Th   us, all else equal, the same tax on 
carbon has a lower cost. Th   ere is a single representative household that consumes goods and services and 
saves.23 Th   e savings rate is partially a function of the demographic structure of the region. Savings rise as 
either the elderly or youth dependency ratios fall. Th   e government sector is relatively passive. Aggregate 
expenditures are ﬁ  xed as a share of total GDP and revenues adjust to maintain ﬁ  scal balance (through a 
lump sum tax on households). Investment is savings driven.
23. Th   e model is designed with several diﬀ  erent consumer demand speciﬁ  cations including the constant diﬀ  erences in elasticities 
(CDE) (see Hertel 1997), the linear expenditure system (LES)/extended linear expenditure system (ELES) (see van der 
Mensbrugghe 2006) and a relatively new implicitly directly additive demand system (AIDADS) (see Rimmer and Powell 1992 
and van der Mensbrugghe 2006). For this paper we have used the AIDADS.33
Aggregate demand by sector is summed across all domestic agents and represents a composite of 
domestically produced goods and imports—the so-called Armington (1969) aggregate. Th  e  aggregate 
Armington good is allocated between domestic production and imports using a two-nested CES 
speciﬁ  cation. Th  e  ﬁ  rst nest allocates aggregate demand between domestic production and an aggregate 
import bundle. Th   e second nest decomposes aggregate imports into imports by region of origin. Th  is 
generates a bilateral trade ﬂ  ow matrix. Domestic producers are assumed to supply both domestic 
and export markets without friction, i.e., the law of one price holds for domestically produced goods 
irrespective of their ﬁ  nal destination.24 Bilateral trade is associated with three price wedges. Th  e  ﬁ  rst 
wedge reﬂ  ects diﬀ  erences between producer prices and the border (FOB) price, i.e., an export tax or 
subsidy. Th   e second wedge reﬂ  ects international trade and transport margins, i.e., the diﬀ  erence between 
FOB and cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) prices. Th   e third wedge reﬂ  ects the diﬀ  erence between the 
CIF price and the end-user price, i.e., import tariﬀ  s. All three wedges are fully bilateral.
Model closure is consistent with long-term equilibrium. As stated above, ﬁ  scal balance is maintained 
through lump sum taxes on households under the assumption of ﬁ  xed public expenditures (relative to 
GDP). Changes in revenues, for example carbon tax revenues, imply a net decrease in household direct 
taxes. Investment is savings driven. Th   is assumption implies that changes in investment are likely to be 
relatively minor because public and foreign savings are ﬁ  xed and household savings will be rather stable 
relative to income. Th   e third closure rule is that the capital account is balanced. Ex ante changes in the 
trade balance are therefore oﬀ  set through real exchange rate eﬀ  ects. A positive rise in net transfers, for 
example through a cap and trade scheme, would tend to lead to a real exchange rate appreciation.
Th   e model dynamics are relatively straightforward. Population and labor force growth rates are 
based on the UN population’s projection (United Nations 2007)—with the growth in the labor force 
equated to the growth of the working age population. Investment, as mentioned above, is savings driven 
and the latter is partially inﬂ  uenced by demographics. Productivity growth in the baseline is “calibrated” 
to achieve a target growth path for per capita incomes—diﬀ  erentiated for agriculture, manufacturing, and 
services.
Emissions of GHGs have three drivers. Most are generated through consumption of goods—either 
in intermediate of ﬁ  nal demand—for example the combustion of fossil fuels. Some are driven by the 
level of factor input—for example methane produced by rice is linked to the amount of cultivated land. 
And the remainder is generated by aggregate output—for example waste-based methane emissions. Th  e 
climate module takes emissions of GHGs as inputs and converts them to atmospheric concentration, then 
radiative forcing, and ﬁ  nally temperature change.25
24. Analogously to aggregate domestic demand, the model allows for a two-nested constant-elasticity-of-transformation function 
to allocate domestic production between domestic and foreign markets.
25. Th   e climate module is largely derived from the Model for Evaluating the Regional and Global Eﬀ  ects (MERGE) model 
(Manne, Mendelsohn, and Richels 1995).34
Th   e temperature change is linked back to the socioeconomic model through damage functions. 
Th   e damage functions—currently limited to agriculture—are calibrated to estimates provided by Cline 
(2007). His estimates relate to anticipated productivity impacts from a 2.5° C in temperature26, estimated 
to occur in 2080. Cline provides two sets of estimates. One set allows for the positive impact of higher 
concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere on plant growth—a so-called carbon fertilization eﬀ  ect. Th  e 
other excludes this eﬀ  ect. Th  e  scientiﬁ  c community is still uncertain about this eﬀ  ect. Greenhouse gas 
experiments suggest it may be potent. Field experiments suggest otherwise. In our simulations, we use the 
average of the two estimates.
Envisage has a ﬂ  exible system of mitigation policies (limited at the moment to CO2 emissions 
alone). Th   e simplest is a country- or region-speciﬁ  c carbon tax that also allows for exemptions for 
designated sectors or households. An alternative is to provide a cap on emissions at either a country, 
regional, or global level. Th   e model will then produce the shadow price of carbon, i.e., the carbon tax, as 
a model outcome. If a global cap is imposed, a single uniform tax will be calculated. Th   is type of regime 
assumes no trading. A ﬁ  nal option is to have a regional or global cap with trading and assigned quotas. 
Similar to the previous regime, a uniform carbon tax will be calculated (and would be nearly identical 
to the no-trade carbon tax), but emissions trading would occur depending on the initial quotas and the 
shape of the individual marginal abatement curves for each member of the trading regime.
One intuitive way to capture the inter-country diﬀ  erences of a carbon tax is the following formula 
that is derived from a simple partial equilibrium framework (see Burniaux, Nicoletti, and Oliveira-
Martins 1992):
(1)  R = 1 –[1 + 
ρ.τ
P] τ =  P




In formula (1), τ is the carbon tax, P is the price of energy (for example dollars per ton of 
oil equivalent), ρ is the average carbon content of energy (for example ton of carbon per ton of oil 
equivalent), σ is the overall elasticity of substitution across factors including energy and R is the level of 
emissions reduction.27 Th   e left-hand side of the formula shows the level of reduction for a given carbon 
tax and the right-hand side shows the level of the carbon tax for a given reduction level. With R equal 
to 0, the carbon tax is obviously 0. Th   e formula shows that the carbon tax is higher (for a given targeted 
reduction) with higher energy prices, lower carbon content (i.e., cleaner economies) and less ﬂ  exible 
economies (i.e., with a low value for σ). Th   is suggests that on average the carbon tax will be lower 
in developing countries that tend to have lower energy prices, higher carbon intensity and relatively 
26. Which he assumes occurs in the 2080s based on the Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) (IPCC 2000) and global 
climate change model (GCM) runs.
27. For example, if energy is priced at $50 per ton of oil equivalent and the average carbon content is 50 percent and the 
substitution elasticity is 0.8 and a carbon tax of $150 per ton of carbon is imposed, the level of reduction would be 52 percent.35
ﬂ  exible economies given their higher savings rates and capital turnover. Th   e implication of this is that on 
aggregate developed countries will wish to purchase carbon oﬀ  sets from developing countries in a cap-
and-trade regime where quotas for developed countries are below baseline emissions.
Unilateral Action and Leakage
One key concern in any carbon regime that excludes major carbon emitters is that production of carbon-
intense goods will move to countries with no (or a lower) price on carbon. Burniaux and Oliveira Martins 
(2000) provide a succinct discussion of the main channels of leakage—distinguishing between nonenergy 
and energy markets. On the nonenergy side, one of the key channels of course is that the higher cost of 
production in countries with a carbon tax will lead to a competitive disadvantage and shift production to 
lower-cost countries. Th   e degree of leakage will therefore depend on the tradability of nonenergy goods 
(reﬂ  ected by the so-called Armington elasticity in most trade models) and on capital mobility. Leakage 
would increase with tradability as the rise in domestic costs would lead to large substitution eﬀ  ects with 
rising imports and declining exports. Th   e role of capital mobility is less clear cut and could potentially go 
in reverse direction (though is closely linked to the Armington elasticity). A drop in international energy 
prices (particularly oil), could potentially lead to a real exchange rate appreciation for Annex I countries 
and a capital inﬂ  ow.
As regards the energy market, the degree of leakage will depend on two eﬀ  ects—how much energy 
prices drop in non-Annex I countries thus leading to increased energy demand and emissions and the 
degree of interfuel substitution. Th   e energy channels are essentially of three kinds. First there is the role 
of “carbon” supply elasticities. As the price of oil drops internationally, there would be a relative switch 
from coal to oil in non-Annex I countries. All else equal, this would tend to reduce leakage as coal is 
more carbon intensive. Th   e lower the supply elasticity of oil, the greater the price drop of oil; the higher 
the supply elasticity of coal, the more its price is invariant to demand changes. Th   e combination of these 
two eﬀ  ects would minimize leakage. Th   is would be moderated to some extent by the degree of tradability 
of coal. A low supply elasticity of coal linked with a highly integrated coal market would induce Annex 
I coal producers to export considerable volumes to non-Annex I countries. For a variety of reasons, 
including logistical, this is an unlikely outcome. Another channel is interfuel substitutability. Here two 
eﬀ  ects can oﬀ  set or reinforce each other—overall demand eﬀ  ect versus substitution eﬀ  ects. 
Numerical Analysis
It is diﬃ   cult to undertake systematic sensitivity analysis with a full-blown CGE model. An alternative 
approach is to reduce the model to some core set of relations that capture the essence of the full model 
and that is amenable to systematic sensitivity analysis. Th   is is the approach taken by Burniaux and 
Oliviera Martins, which we have attempted to replicate with some modiﬁ  cations. We have reconstructed 36
their model, but have converted it to a model in levels rather than linearized in percent deviation. Second, 
we have calibrated the model to the same database as the Envisage model with a 2004 base instead of the 
1985 database. Th   ird, rather than replicate their pair-wise sensitivity analysis, which clearly illustrates 
the impacts of the various channels, we take a probabilistic approach that assumes some probability 
distribution for each of the uncertain key parameters.
Th   e stochastic approach we take is the same as used by Hope (2006) with the PAGE2002 model 
and that underscored many of the numerical results in the Stern Review (2007). Th   e approach uses a 
technique called Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) (see McKay, Conover, and Beckman 1979 and Swiler 
and Wyss 2004). It is a restricted form of Monte Carlo simulation where the multivariate sampling is 
done from a limited number of observations but whose statistical properties match closely those that 
would be generated from full Monte Carlo sampling. Th   e resulting sample (of 10,000 in our case) of 
the key parameter values are used in the reduced form model and generate a distribution of the leakage 
rates. Table 1c shows the list of the key parameters in the reduced form model28 with the mode value. Th  e 
mode variable corresponds roughly with the parameter values in the full Envisage model. Each parameter 
is assigned a triangular distribution that covers the assumed range of the parameter.
Appendix ﬁ  gure 1 depicts the frequency distribution generated by the sampling exercise. Th  e  policy 
shock is a 28-percent reduction in Annex I emissions (corresponding to the 17-percent reduction target 
relative to 2005 that translates into a 28-percent reduction relative to 2020 baseline values). Th  e  mean 
leakage rate using the reduced form model is 11 percent with a standard deviation of 5 percent. A little 
over 1 percent of the sample exhibited a leakage rate of below zero and 94 percent of the sample fell 
between a leakage rate of 0 and 20 percent. 
Th   e leakage rate generated by Envisage is considerably lower than the mean of 11 percent. Th  ere  are 
a number of potential causes that need further exploration. First, the production structure in Envisage is 
diﬀ  erent from that in the maquette as we tailored it more to the Burniaux and Oliveira Martins model 
and not to Envisage. Second, the data calibration could be impacting some of the key relations—across 
fuels and with the emission coeﬃ   cients. Th   ird, there might be strong compositional eﬀ  ects—both across 
regions and across sectors that would aﬀ  ect the overall impact on the leakage rate.
In the literature there is not a plethora of leakage estimates—and they are hard to compare in any 
case: (1) because the nature of the shock is diﬀ  erent (e.g., many of the earlier estimates focused on the 
potential leakage eﬀ  ects from the Kyoto Protocol); (2) diﬀ  erent model base years and baselines; and 
(3) diﬀ  erent model speciﬁ  cations and key elasticities. Burniaux and Oliveira Martins cite a range of 
leakage rates with respect to the Kyoto Protocol of between 2 and 21 percent. Fischer and Fox (2009) 
provide some leakage rates at the sectoral level that range from 8 to 64 percent from a simulation of the 
28. Details of the reduced-form model are available from the authors.37
imposition of a carbon tax of $50 per ton of carbon. Again the comparison with the results discussed 
herein is diﬃ   cult as the nature of the model and the shock is quite diﬀ  erent. Th   e paper is also silent 
on the relative fossil fuel supply elasticities that appear to be so crucial. Babiker (2005) focuses on the 
leakage eﬀ  ects from the Kyoto Protocol. Th   e leakage eﬀ  ects range from around 25 to over 100 percent, 
albeit the model assumes a low coal supply elasticity (0.5). Th   e paper is interesting because it shows the 
sensitivity of the leakage rate to two key assumptions—the tradability of goods (comparing an Armington 
model with a Hecksher-Ohlin speciﬁ  cation) and constant versus increasing rates of return. Burniaux 
and Oliveira Martins suggest that the tradability parameter has relatively little impact on the leakage rate 
and given the high Armington elasticities we are using, one wouldn’t expect a large eﬀ  ect from moving 
to a Hecksher-Ohlin speciﬁ  cation. However, Babiker demonstrates that this no longer holds true with 
increasing returns to scale. Given the wide range of uncertainty, it would appear that this issue would 
beneﬁ  t from a more detailed study comparing leakage rates across models with some initial harmonization 
on key assumptions and then exploring alternatives.38
Appendix fi  gure 1     Frequency distribution of leakage rate
Source:  Authors’ calculations.39
Appendix table 1a     Regional dimensions of Envisagea
1 eur EU27 with EFTA
Austria (aut), Belgium (bel), Cyprus (cyp), Czech Republic (cze), Denmark (dnk), Estonia (est), Finland (fi  n), 
France (fra), Germany (deu), Greece (grc), Hungary (hun), Ireland (irl), Italy (ita), Latvia (lva), Lithuania (ltu), 
Luxembourg (lux), Malta (mlt), Netherlands (nld), Poland (pol), Portugal (prt), Slovakia (svk), Slovenia (svn), 
Spain (esp), Sweden (swe), United Kingdom (gbr), Switzerland (che), Norway (nor), Rest of EFTA (xef), Bulgaria 
(bgr), Romania (rou)
2 usa United States
3 jpn Japan
4 kor Korea
5 rha Rest of high income Annex 1
Australia (aus), New Zealand (nzl), Canada (can)
6 rhy Rest of high income





10 xea Rest of East Asia
Rest of Oceania (xoc), Rest of East Asia (xea), Cambodia (khm), Laos (lao), Myanmar (mmr), Viet Nam (vnm), 
Indonesia (idn), Malaysia (mys), Philippines (phl), Thailand (tha), Bangladesh (bgd), Pakistan (pak)
11 xsa Rest of South Asia
Rest of Southeast Asia (xse), Sri Lanka (lka), Rest of South Asia (xsa)
12 xec Rest of Europe and Central Asia
Albania (alb), Belarus (blr), Croatia (hrv), Ukraine (ukr), Rest of Eastern Europe (xee), Rest of Europe (xer), 
Kazakhstan (kaz), Kyrgystan (kgz), Rest of Former Soviet Union (xsu), Armenia (arm), Azerbaijan (aze), Georgia 
(geo)
13 mna Middle East and North Africa
Iran (irn), Turkey (tur), Rest of Western Asia (xws), Egypt (egy), Morocco (mar), Tunisia (tun), Rest of North Africa 
(xnf)
14 ssa Sub-Saharan Africa
Nigeria (nga), Senegal (sen), Rest of Western Africa (xwf), Central Africa (xcf), South-Central Africa (xac), Ethio-
pia (eth), Madagascar (mdg), Malawi (mwi), Mauritius (mus), Mozambique (moz), Tanzania (tza), Uganda (uga), 
Zambia (zmb), Zimbabwe (zwe), Rest of Eastern Africa (xec), Botswana (bwa), South Africa (zaf), Rest of South 
African Customs Union (xsc)
15 xlc Rest of Latin America and the Caribbean
Mexico (mex), Rest of North America (xna), Argentina (arg), Bolivia (bol), Chile (chl), Colombia (col), Ecuador 
(ecu), Paraguay (pry), Peru (per), Uruguay (ury), Venezuela (ven), Rest of South America (xsm), Costa Rica (cri), 
Guatemala (gtm), Nicaragua (nic), Panama (pan), Rest of Central America (xca), Caribbean (xcb)
a. Aggregate regions indicate relevant GTAP countries/regions with GTAP code in parenthesis.
Source: Authors’ aggregation of GTAP data. 40
Appendix table 1b Sectoral dimensions of Envisagea
1 cop Crops
Paddy rice (pdr), Wheat (wht), Cereal grains, n.e.s. (gro), Vegetables and fruits (v_f), Oil seeds (osd), Sugar cane 
and sugar beet (c_b), Plant-based fi  bers (pfb), Crops, n.e.s. (ocr)
2 lvs Livestock




5 oil Crude oil
6 gas Natural gas
7 omn Other mining
8 pfd Processed food
Fishing (fsh), Bovine cattle, sheep and goat, horse meat products (cmt), Meat products n.e.s. (omt), Vegetable 
oils and fats (vol), Dairy products (mil), Processed rice (pcr), Sugar (sgr), Food products n.e.s. (ofd), Beverages 
and tobacco products (b_t)
9 p_c Refi  ned oil
10 crp Chemicals rubber and plastics
11 ppp Paper products, publishing
12 nmm Mineral products n.e.s.
13 i_s Ferrous metals
14 nfm Metals n.e.s.
15 tre Transport equipment
Motor vehicles and parts (mvh), Transport equipment n.e.s. (otn)
16 mnu Other manufacturing
Textiles (tex), Wearing apparel (wap), Leather products (lea), Wood products (lum), Metal products (fmp), 
Electronic equipment (ele), Machinery and equipment n.e.s. (ome), Manufactures n.e.s. (omf)
17 ely Electricityb
18 gdt Gas distribution
19 cns Construction
20 trp Transport services
Transport n.e.s. (otp), Sea transport (wtp), Air transport (atp)
21 osv Other services
Water (wtr), Trade (trd), Communication (cmn), Financial services n.e.s. (ofi  ), Insurance (isr), Business services 
n.e.s. (obs), Recreation and other services (ros), Public administration and defence, education, health services 
(osg), Dwellings (dwe)
a. Aggregate sectors indicate relevant GTAP sectors with GTAP code in parenthesis. 
b. Electricity is a single consumed and traded commodity. However, in each region/country it is produced by multiple activities that include coal and gas 
power plants, hydro-electricity, nuclear and other (mainly renewable) technologies.
Source: Authors’ aggregation of GTAP data. 41
Appendix table 1c     Key elasticities with reference bounds
AnnexI Non Annex I
Minimum Mode Maximum Minimum Mode Maximum
Production substitution elasticities
σ
p Energy-value added 0.2 0.4 1.2 0.2 0.4 1.2
σ
e Inter-fuel 0.5 0.6 3.0 0.5 0.8 3.0
σ
v Capital-labor 0.3 0.8 1.2 0.6 1.0 1.2
Energy supply elasticities
ε
coal Coal 0.0 5.0 20.0 0.0 5.0 20.0
ε
oil Oil 0.0 1.5 3.0 0.0 1.5 3.0
ε
Other-energy Lower carbon energy 0.0 1.5 3.0 0.0 1.5 3.0
Armington trade elasticities
σ
Non-energy Non-energy good 1.5 4.0 8.0 1.5 4.0 8.0
σ
coal Coal 2.0 5.0 10.0 2.0 5.0 10.0
σ
Other-energy Lower carbon energy 1.5 4.0 8.0 1.5 4.0 8.0
International mobility of capital
ω
k Transformation elasticity 0.0 1.0 20.0








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix table 4     Change in welfare by region (percent)
NBTA17 BTAFU BTADU BTADE BTAFR BTADR
EU27withEFTA -0.7 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6
UnitedStates -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
Japan -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
-0.9 -1.0 -0.8 -1.1 -0.9 -0.9
Rest of highincome -0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2
Brazil -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2
China -0.2 -3.7 -0.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.3
India 0.0 -1.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 -0.1
Russia -1.1 -3.6 -1.7 -1.7 -1.8 -1.4
Rest of East Asia -0.4 -1.3 -0.9 -0.6 -0.8 -0.6
Rest of South Asia -0.3 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3
Rest of ECA -0.3 -2.3 -0.9 -0.8 -1.5 -0.7
Middle East and North Africa -0.1 -2.4 -0.7 0.0 -0.6 -0.3
Sub-SaharanAfrica -0.5 -1.2 -1.0 -0.7 -0.9 -0.7
Rest of LAC -0.7 -1.8 -1.4 -0.8 -1.1 -0.9
High income countries -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
-0.3 -2.4 -0.8 -0.5 -0.8 -0.5




Rest of high-income Annex 1
Low- andmiddle-income countries
Notes: NBTA17:Industrial countriesalone reduce emissionsby 17 percent and take no trade policy action;
BTAFU: Industrial countriesalone reduce emissionsby 17 percent and impose tariffson all merchandise imports
based on carbon content in imports; BTADU:Industrial countriesalone reduce emissionsby 17 percent and
impose tariffson all merchandise importsbased on carbon content in domestic production;
BTADE:Industrial countriesalone reduce emissionsby 17 percent with import tariffson all merchandise imports
and rebateson all merchandise exportsbased on carbon content in domestic production;BTAFR:
Industrial countriesalone reduce emissionsby 17 percent and impose tariffson energy-intensive merchandise
importsbased on carbon content in imports; BTADR:Industrial countriesalone reduce emissionsby 17 percent 
and impose tariffson energy-intensive merchandise importsbased on carbon content in domestic
production.45
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